Abstract-We address the problem of centralized detection of a binary event in the presence of falsifiable sensor nodes (SNs) (i.e., controlled by an attacker) for a bandwidth constrained under−attack spatially uncorrelated distributed wireless sensor network. The SNs send their quantized test statistics over orthogonal channels to the fusion center (FC), which linearly combines them to reach a final decision. First (considering that the FC and the attacker do not act strategically), we derive: 1) the FC optimal weight combining; 2) the optimal SN to FC transmit power; and 3) the test statistic quantization bits that maximize the probability of detection ( P d ). We also derive an expression for the attacker strategy that causes the maximum possible FC degradation. But in these expressions, both the optimum FC strategy and the attacker strategy require a-priori knowledge that cannot be obtained in practice. The performance analysis of sub-optimum FC strategies is then characterized, and based on the (compromised) SNs willingness to collaborate, we also derive analytically the sub-optimum attacker strategies. Then, considering that the FC and the attacker now act strategically, we recast the problem as a minimax game between the FC and the attacker and prove that the Nash equilibrium (NE) exists. Finally, we find this NE numerically in the simulation results and this gives insight into the detection performance of the proposed strategies.
Distributed Binary Event Detection Under Data-Falsification and Energy-Bandwidth Limitation
I. INTRODUCTION C ENTRALIZED detection of a binary event is one of the most important applications of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [1] , [2] . Multiple low-cost sensor nodes (SNs) are often spatially deployed over a specific field to observe such binary events. The SNs process the observed data and report back to a fusion center (FC) that optimally combines to reach a global decision. Being geographically dispersed to cover large areas, the SNs are constrained in both bandwidth and power. Moreover, SNs are usually unattended and this makes them vulnerable to different types of attacks. The overall detection performance strongly depends on the reliability of these SNs in the network. While fusing the data received by the spatially deployed SNs allows the FC to make a reliable decision, it is possible that one or more SNs (compromised by an attacker) deliberately falsify their local observations to degrade the overall FC detection performance. However, there are a number of different approaches as to how the test statistics received from each SN can be efficiently used in order to achieve a reliable FC decision. Before introducing our proposed strategies, we will first give a brief review of related work.
The framework of distributed detection under attack−free WSNs has been extensively studied in [3] - [13] , to name but just a few references. While [3] - [7] consider centralized detection by assuming WSNs with unlimited bandwidth/resources, the latter assumption was relaxed in [8] - [13] by considering centralized detection over bandwidth-constrained/energyconstrained WSNs. But these approaches are vulnerable to some security attacks as some of the SNs reporting to the FC may be compromised. As a result, the FC is not robust against such attacks and its detection performance may be degraded.
However, security issues in centralized detection using WSNs remain an open issue, see [14] - [19] and references therein. While there are many types of security threats, in this paper we focus on a single type of attack, which is the test statistic falsification (TSF) attack part of the Byzantine attacks family originally proposed by [20] and later widely used in the context of distributed detection (e.g., [19] , [21] , [22] ).
Reference [22] characterizes the power of the attack analytically and a closed-form expression for the worst "detection error" is provided. Also, the minimum fraction of the compromised SNs that makes the FC incapable is derived. Reference [23] presents a technique to identify such compromised SNs and then to exclude them from contributing to the FC fusion process. In [24] , a probabilistic TSF attack is proposed and the theoretical performance evaluation (in terms of destructiveness and stealthiness) is obtained. The authors of [25] , in the context of smart grids, propose heuristic centralized algorithms to derive various strategies (attacker versus defender (i.e., FC) dynamics). Then, a distributed algorithm is proposed that guarantees convergence to the centralized solution taken at the FC.
Detection in the presence of binary falsification 1 (Byzantine) attacks is considered in [26] . Here, a reputationbased scheme is proposed for identifying the compromised SNs by accumulating the deviations between each SN and the FC decision over a time window duration. The authors in [27] also consider binary Byzantine attacks, in the context of target localization, where the SNs transmit their binary decisions to the FC. These authors also propose two techniques to mitigate the negative input of the compromised SNs on the FC decision. However, identifying and then excluding the contributions of the compromised SNs from the FC decision process may not be the best strategy. For instance, we might end up removing (from contributing towards the global decision) compromised SNs that hold useful information (e.g., those SNs with high local SNRs). Furthermore, performing detection by means of one-bit SNs report combining at the FC is also not optimum. Now, the publication closest to the work presented in this paper is [19] , where an under − attack WSN framework over unlimited bandwidth is considered (i.e., infinite channel capacity) and the detection performance is investigated. But as the SNs are battery operated devices (i.e., limited power) and the bandwidth is finite, the assumption of infinite capacity is unrealistic. Furthermore, practical WSN scenarios suffer from fading and attenuation. The authors of [19] also do not propose any technique to mitigate the degradation caused by these compromised SNs.
So, the work in this paper investigates the detection performance of the under − attack energy-constrained/bandwidthconstrained WSNs. The compromised SNs (controlled by the attacker), are assumed to know the true hypothesis 2 (e.g., [19] , [22] ) and they use this a-priori knowledge to construct the most effective strategy to make the FC's decision unreliable. For the FC, we assume that it is not compromised and receives the test statistic from both types of SNs (i.e., compromised and honest). The transmission (SNs to FC) links are modeled as flat fading, additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels. The assumption of flat fading is reasonable as most of the WSNs operate at both short distances and low bit-rate due to resource limitations.
A. Contributions & Organization
While previous publications (as outlined above) have also examined sensor networks in the presence of falsified SNs, this paper deals with more realistic scenarios that include limited bandwidth fading channels, quantization of test statistics, etc. So our main contributions are as follows:
(i) We develop an efficient FC linear weight combining framework for an under−attack WSN that operates over limited bandwidth fading channels. The probability of detection (P d ) and the probability of false alarm (P f a ) based on this framework are derived in a closed-form. To maximize P d for a fixed P f a and to further reduce the optimisation complexity, we adopt the modified deflection coefficient (MDC) as an alternative function to be optimized and provide an optimisation problem to be solved from both the FC's and the attacker's perspective. Based on this optimisation problem (from the FC's perspective), we derive analytically the optimal weight combining, the optimal SN to FC transmit power and the number of quantization bits for each SN. Unfortunately, these expressions require a-priori knowledge about the attacker parameters which cannot be attained in practice. Then (from the attacker's perspective), we derive analytically (for a fixed number of compromised SNs) the optimum attacker strategy which also depends upon the FC weight combining and the SNs transmit power.
(ii) So, motivated by the above, we next analyze the problem under different attacking and defending scenarios and characterize analytically the performance of sub-optimum strategies (from both the FC's and the attacker's perspective) that do not require knowledge of the FC mechanism and the attacker parameters. Also, based on the willingness of collaboration among the SNs (from the attacker's perspective), we distinguish between two setups: a) all the SNs (compromised and honest) share their data with their neighbors, and b) just the compromised SNs are willing to collaborate among themselves to improve their attack strength.
(iii) Finally, we re-cast the problem as a minimax game between the FC and attacker and show that the NE (Nash Equilibrium) exists. Having defined the game, we use numerical simulations to find this NE point, thus identifying the optimum behavior of both the FC and the attacker in a gametheoretical sense. Now, the summary of the paper is as follows. In Section II we describe the system model and provide a data transmission scheme. Section III describes the optimisation problem from both the FC's and the attacker's perspective. In Section IV we present our proposed attacker and FC strategies and in Section V we re-cast the problem and analyze the equilibrium. Finally, in Section VI we present simulation results and in Section VII we give some conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND DATA TRANSMISSION Consider the problem of detecting the presence of an unknown but deterministic signal s(n) by an under − attack WSN consisting of M geographically distributed SNs and a FC (see Fig. 1 ). The honest SNs are represented with a black color and the compromised SNs (i.e., the ones controlled by the attacker) with a red color. The attacker's aim is to successfully manipulate the FC global decision making process while the FC would like to detect reliably (i.e., with very
high probability). Each SN collects N samples of the observed signal and performs energy estimation. Consistent with the underlying hypotheses, the measured signal (s i (n)) at the i th SN will be further corrupted by AWGN
The i th SN evaluates:
which for large N can be approximated by a Gaussian distribution [28] . It is not difficult to derive appropriate statistics in (4) , as shown at the top of the this page, where
While the honest SNs transmit the actual test statistic (i.e., the true energies) to the FC, the compromised SNs falsify them before transmitting to the FC. Next we introduce the attacker model.
A. Compromised SNs Attack
In this work, the same attack model used in [19] is considered. The attacker (which has under its control a fraction (β) of the SNs) is assumed to know the true hypothesis 2 in (5) (e.g., [19] , [22] ). The remaining SNs are honest and completely unaware of the presence of falsified SNs. The i th compromised SN falsifies its test statistic (T i ) before transmitting to the FC as follows:
where C i > 0 is the parameter under the attacker's control. As we show later, there is an optimum C i such that the detection performance back at the FC will be degraded the most. So, the test statistic (assuming compromised SNs) at the i th SN can be represented aŝ
where β is the fraction of the compromised SNs controlled by the attacker.
B. Data Transmission
Now, because the SNs are battery operated devices (i.e., with limited on-board energy) then each SN i (i = 1, 2, · · · , M) has to quantize its test statistic (T i ) to L i bits prior to transmission to the FC. We assume that the FC is able to collect data from all the SNs via bandwidth constrained communication channels and furthermore, it is not itself compromised. As in [9] and [13] , we restrict the number of quantization bits at the i th SN to satisfy the channel capacity constraint:
where p i denotes the transmit power of sensor i , h i is the flat fading coefficient between SN i and the FC, and ζ i is the variance of the AWGN at the FC. The quantized test statistic (T q i ) at the i th SN can be modeled (with L i bits ) as
where v i is quantization noise independent of w i (n) in (1) and (2) . Assuming
with probability 1 − β.
Now, assuming a uniform quantizer with L i bits (i.e., with a total of 2 L i quantization levels), the quantizer step-size is always =
2U 2 L i
and now v i (see (8) ) can be modeled as a r.v. uniformly distributed 3 with
, where it is wellknown that
Note that the above analysis shows that the attacker (i.e., through the compromised SNs), does not introduce a larger quantization error noise (i.e., σ 2 v i in (10) remains the same as in the case of attack − f ree [9] ). Now, linearly
at the FC gives (11) where the weights α i M i=1 will be optimized in Section III-A. For large M, the probability of detection (P d ) and the probability of false alarm (P f a ) can be approximated and shown to be respectively [19] :
is the i th column vector of B (where B = 1 − β P + βP c ) and represents element-wise multiplication); the matrix P is a binary matrix holding the 2 M possible combinations of M (compromised and honest) SNs on its rows with (P) i j = {0, 1} representing the compromised and honest SNs respectively (note that (P) i j represents the (i, j ) element of P); and P c is the element-wise (i.e., bitwise) logical complement of P. Now,
|H p are given in (4) and in (13) , shown at the top of this page, respectively.
Finally, Q(.) represents the element-wise Q function operation. Next, we describe the optimisation problem under a power-constrained WSN.
III. FC AND ATTACKER PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION UNDER A POWER-CONSTRAINED WSN
Now, if the attacker (which has under its control a fraction (β) of the M SNs) can successfully manipulate the FC global decision making process, the detection rate will be significantly low, the error rate in decision making will be high and the FC performance will be degraded. From the attacker's point of view, the more error it causes in the FC decision making, the more successful it is. The attacker has two available strategies: a) direct the compromised SNs to actually report their observation to the FC truthfully or b) direct the compromised SNs to falsify their observations prior to transmission to the FC. In the cases where the attacker decides to direct the compromised SNs to falsify their test statistics, what should be their optimum attacking parameter (C i )? We will answer this question in Section III-B.
From the FC's point of view, its data fusion mechanism should be robust and capable of defending against any attacking strategy adopted by any compromised SNs and directed by the attacker. The FC is aware that the attacker has an objective in conflict with its own (i.e., the FC tries to maximize the detection probability while the attacker tries to minimize it). However, the FC does not have any exact information about the attacking strategies. The only information available to the FC is: a) the quantized test statistics
reported by M spatially distributed SNs, and b) the fraction 4 (β) of these test statistics that are falsified. But it cannot recognize where these SNs are and estimate their "falsification parameter", C i . So, the fusion data mechanism (based on this limited a-pri ori information) should be able to neutralize (or at least reduce) the impact of these compromised SNs.
So, in this Section, we would like to analyze the performance optimisation from the perspective of the FC and the attacker under a constraint of a maximum transmit power budget (P t ). Since the FC has under its control only the weight combiners (α i , ∀i ) in (11) and the SN to FC transmit power ( p i , ∀i ) in (7), its strategy is to maximize P d with respect to the respective vectors containing these parameters (i.e., α and p). However, this is difficult and no closedform solution can be obtained. Here, we introduce the MDC (which we will use later as an alternative function to be optimized). The MDC provides a good measure of the detection performance since it characterizes the variance-normalized distance between the centers of two conditional PDFs. This is given as:
with the appropriate quantities given in (15) and (16), as shown at the top of the this page, and where
. . .
A. FC Performance Optimisation Now, the FC task (which knows that the WSN is under−attack) is to maximize the P d (i.e., to detect with very high probability). We would like to make it clear that the FC knows 4 β (i.e., knows the average percentage of compromised SNs (e.g., [19] , [22] )) but it cannot identify exactly who they are. Given the data fusion (11), the FC performs the following test:
where f is the FC detection threshold. As we said earlier, the optimum weighting vector (α o ) and the optimum power allocation vector ( p o ) that maximize P d under the constraint of a maximum transmit power budget (P t ) are desired. More specifically (adopting the MDC), we require:
It is easily shown [9] that α o = R −1 b with
Note that the optimum weights α
are a function of the
terms (see (7) and (10)) and p i is still to be optimized. We now substitute α o back into (14) and solve the following optimisation problem
It can also be shown [9] , that the above optimisation problem can be solved analytically by using the Lagrangian function and solving the appropriate K.K.T. conditions. The optimum SN to FC transmit power in this case (i.e., where the WSN is under−attack) can be shown to be
where [y] + equals 0 if y < 0, otherwise it equals y, and λ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier that can be evaluated in a similar way as in [9] by imposing the equality constraint (19) . Now, (21) assumes that the FC knows the channel coefficients (h i ) for all SNs (honest and compromised). While the FC can obtain this information via a feedback from the honest SNs, the compromised SNs may transmit to the FC wrong information regarding the channel. Nevertheless, here we assume that the compromised SNs only falsify their test statistics as in (5) and report true channel 5 5 The channel estimation error (for both the honest and compromised SNs) can be modeled as a Gaussian random variable (i.e.,ĥ i j = h i j + e h ) where
) andĥ i j is the estimated flat fading channel coefficient.
information to the FC. However, the channel information, for the compromised SNs, could be obtained by blind channel estimation techniques, etc., [29] , [30] . Next, we analyze the performance optimisation from the attacker perspective.
B. Attacker Performance Optimisation
Now, the attacker would like to degrade as much as possible the FC detection performance. For a constant β (i.e., fraction of compromised SNs) the attacker plans the optimum C i in (5) such that the FC becomes inefficient (i.e., useless). Adopting again the MDC (14) , the optimisation problem can be expressed as:
Note that (14) reaches its minimum value (i.e., zero) when
Assuming that C i = C, ∀i (i.e., the same attack strength for all the compromised SNs) for simplicity, clearly the minimum of (14) can be achieved with
Now, this yields the maximum possible degradation that the attacker can cause to the FC. As can be seen, the optimum attacker strategy (C o ) is a function of the FC strategy (i.e., α i in (11) which itself is a function of p i through the σ 2 v i quantity (see (7) , (10) and (20)). So, in order to adopt this strategy, the attacker needs to know α i and p i , ∀i . Since the FC is not compromised (i.e., still acts accordingly), these quantities cannot normally be obtained by the attacker.
As can be seen from the optimum FC weight protection strategy (20) and the attacker optimum strategy (23), there does not exist a dominant 6 approach. Clearly the FC weights (α i in (11)) depend on the attacker parameter C i and vice versa. Next, we discuss in more detail the attacker versus the FC strategies and provide performance analysis in cases where limited a-priori knowledge about the attacker is available (i.e., without the need of exact knowledge of C i ).
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this Section, starting with the optimum attacker strategy (23) and depending on the collaboration willingness among SNs and the available a-priori information that the attacker has about the FC combining strategy, we distinguish between two simulation setups in Section IV-A. Next, in Section IV-B we distinguish again between two different simulation setups but now from the perspective of the FC mechanisms. 
A. Sub-Optimum Attacker's Strategies
Here, we assume that the attacker knows that the FC uses a linear combining strategy but it is not aware of the combining weights used in (11) . We also assume that the FC does not act strategically and uses weight combining, without trying to optimize against the behavior of compromised SNs. We now distinguish between the two following setups A-1 and A-2.
1) Honest and Compromised SNs Collaborate (HCSC):
Now, the optimum strategy (23) to be adopted by each compromised SN requires knowledge that cannot be obtained in practice as previously discussed. As a result, the attacker (not aware of α i and p i , ∀i ) reasonably assumes equal combining at the FC (i.e., α i = 1 M , ∀i ) and directs the compromised SNs to attack with
where the superscript "H C SC" refers to "H onest and Compromised S Ns Collaborate". However, the compromised SNs still require knowledge of σ 2 i and ξ i , ∀i
i ξ i ) in order to implement the attacking strategy (24) . When all the M SNs (honest and compromised) form a connected network 7 and are willing to collaborate with each other (see Fig. 2 ), the quantity (24) can be estimated using the average consensus algorithm [31] . Because of the communication topology for the M SNs (i.e., not fully connected), the average consensus algorithm ensures the availability of this term at each SN. The compromised SNs will still be camouflaged (i.e., unidentified) as they share with their neighbors just the true quantity σ 2 i ξ i and the SNs cannot identify if their neighbors are honest or compromised.
2) Compromised SNs (Only) Collaborate (CSC): Now, in the cases where not all of the M SNs (compromised and 7 A connected network is any network where there is a path (i.e., over one or more links) between every pair of SNs in the network. honest) are willing to collaborate with each other, the quantity
i ξ i in (23) cannot be obtained in practice. Note that the attacker has under its control just a fraction (β) (β = F M ≤ 1, where F is the number of falsified SNs) of M SNs (see Fig. 2 ) and the other remaining honest SNs (M − F) do not share their observations with their neighbors. In this situation, the F compromised SNs collaborate with each other in order to estimate in a distributed fashion the i∈J σ 2 i ξ i quantity, where J represents the compromised SNs set with cardinality F. Assuming that the F falsified SNs form a connected 7 network, the average consensus algorithm [31] (like before) ensures the availability of this term at each falsified SN. After this stage, the compromised SNs attack (i.e., falsify their test statistics (3) as in (5)) with C i = C C SC , ∀i with
where the superscript "C SC" refers to "Compromised S Ns (only) Collaborate".
B. Sub-Optimum FC's Strategies
Now, the optimum weights (α o i , ∀i ) in (20) are a function of the attacker parameter C i which is difficult in practice (if not impossible) to obtain by the FC. In such a case, the FC adopts a sub-optimum but simple solution to minimize the degradation caused by the attacker. Assuming that the attacker does not act strategically (i.e., does not try to optimize against the FC approach) we now distinguish between the two following simulation setups B-1 and B-2.
1) Weak Attack FC Based Belief (WAFBB):
Now, when the number of observed samples (N) is large and the FC believes that the attacker is directing the i th compromised SN to attack with relatively small C i , the FC weight combining can be approximated with
where the superscript "W AFB B" refers to "W eak Attack FC Based Belief " and the optimum SN to FC transmit power can be also approximated with
Now, (26) and (27) coincide with the optimum weights and with the optimal SN transmit power allocation scheme respectively derived for the case of attack − f ree WSN in [9] .
2) Optimum Attack FC Based Belief (OAFBB):
Here, we consider the case when the FC believes that the attacker, with a fraction (β) of SNs under its control, attacks with the optimum parameter C o (see (23)) (i.e., with C i = C o in (5) but with
First of all, note that the FC knows that the compromised SNs (i.e., the attacker) have an alternative objective (i.e., the attacker would like to minimize, while the FC would like to maximize, the MDC in (14)) (i.e., the FC can work out the optimisation problem from the attacker perspective and evaluate (23)). Secondly, the FC concludes that the attacker cannot adopt this strategy in practice (since this optimum strategy requires α i , ∀i and this parameter is controlled by the FC itself). In such a situation, it is reasonable that the FC believes that the attacker guides the compromised SNs to attack with C o (see (23) (20) and rearranging the terms):
The SN to FC transmit power ( p
O AF B B i
) can be obtained in a similar way (by substituting (21)). Lastly, the superscript "O AFB B" refers to "Optimum Attack FC Based Belie f ".
V. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider the case where both the attacker and the FC act strategically and formulate the problem as a minimax game between two players, i.e., the attacker and the FC. The attacker has under its control one parameter (i.e., C i ∀i ∈ J , with J defined in Section IV-A.2) while the FC has control of the weight combining vector (i.e., α). As before, assuming C = C i (i.e., the same attack strength for each compromised SN) for simplicity, we first of all prove the existence of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) 8 by showing that there exists a unique saddle-point in the minimax game between the attacker and the FC. Then, we find the optimum solution numerically by maximizing the deflection coefficient with respect to the FC weight combining parameter and then by minimizing it with respect to the attacker parameter (i.e., w.r.t. C). Next, we present a theorem, by help of which in Section V-A and Section V-B we prove the existence of NE.
Theorem 1 (Nikaido, [34] ): Let K(x, y) be a pay-off function defined on the product space of X by Y, where X and Y are convex compact sets and continuous in each variable for any fixed value of the other. If K(x, y) is quasi-concave in x and quasi-convex in y, then:
Next, we present the behavior of the MDC w.r.t. attacker strength C. 8 A Nash equilibrium, is a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has the incentive to unilaterally change its action. Players are in equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of them would lead that player to earn less than if it remained with its current strategy.
A. Modified Deflection Coefficient Behavior With Respect to C
In the next Lemma we prove the quasi-convexity behavior of the MDC w.r.t. C.
Lemma 1: For a given α and p,d 2 in (14) is a quasi-convex function of C.
Proof: The MDC can be written as:
where
Now considering α as a constant, differentiated 2 w.r.t. C and by further simplification, we obtain:
So solving the above yields two critical points:
Now, for a feasible attacker strength (i.e., for C > 0), the critical point C * 1 is feasible if x, b > 0 or x, b < 0. So, we have the following:
1 is a global minimum. (33) We also conclude that the other critical point C * 2 is not even a feasible point (i.e., C * 2 < 0) for x, b > 0 and x, b < 0. Hence, there is only one value of C = C * 1 at whichd 2 = 0. As a result, C * 1 being the unique global minimum ⇒d 2 is a quasi-convex function of C.
B. Modified Deflection Coefficient Behavior With Respect to α and p
Now, in Lemma 2, we show the behavior ofd 2 in (14) from the perspective of the FC.
Lemma 2: For a given C and p,d 2 is a concave function of α.
Proof: Consider (14), then the Hessian ofd 2 w.r.t. α (i.e., Hd 2 ) can easily shown to be:
Now, to prove thatd 2 is a concave function of α, we need to show [33] : α T Hd 2 α ≤ 0, ∀α. This is given in Appendix. (20) is the optimum solution. This concludes the proof.
Similarly, treating C (i.e., the attacker strength) fixed and for a given α (i.e., the weight combiner vector) it can be easily shown thatd 2 is also a concave function of p and p o i in (21) is the optimum solution. The proof is straightforward and we omit it here due to lack of space. Now, since any concave function is quasi-concave, then by Theorem 1, a unique saddle-point exists in the minimax game which is the NE. We numerically evaluate this NE in the simulation results section.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this Section, the performances of the proposed strategies are evaluated numerically and compared to the attack − f ree scheme [9] . A WSN with a total of M = 12 SNs is considered (where a fraction of these SNs are compromised by the attacker with the same attacking strength (i.e., C i = C, ∀i ) for simplicity). We let σ 2 i = 0.1, such that ξ a = 10 log 10
= −10.5 dB with arbitrarily chosen = 0) for simplicity and are shown in Fig. 3 . In addition we let ζ i = 0.1, ∀i . Finally, we choose L i with equality in (7).
A. SN to FC Optimal Transmit Power Allocation and FC Weight Combining Strategy
Now, we investigate the SN to FC transmit power for the optimum allocation scheme 9 and the FC optimal weight combining strategy derived in Section III-A. 9 The optimum SN power allocation scheme requires knowledge of the attacker strength C i (see (21) ). This is a strong assumption in practice and the exact knowledge of C i cannot be attained in general. Nevertheless, here we consider this situation for performance comparison purposes and to create an idea about how the SN to FC transmit power allocation is affected. Clearly, for the case of C = 0 (i.e., the attack−free scheme in [9] ), more power is allocated to the SNs (i.e., SN3, SN8, SN9, SN10, and SN12) having both the best channels and high enough SNRs (ξ i ). Interestingly, those remaining SNs having very low SNRs (i.e., having useless local information) but having good (or bad) corresponding channels, are censored (i.e., do not transmit even a single bit). In this way, the SNs that have very bad channels (i.e., SNs that require very high power to transmit) or the SNs that have low SNRs (i.e., SNs that do not contain useful information) will be censored (i.e., will not transmit even one bit). This is not the case when C = 0.5 or C = 5 (we give an explanation later).
In Fig. 4 we investigate the FC combining response (with weight in (20)) versus attacker strength C. Clearly, when C = 0, the weights for the SNs permitted to transmit to the FC (i.e., SN3, SN8, SN9, SN10, and SN12) are greater than 0. As expected, the weights for the other remaining SNs are set to 0 (as these SNs are censored). Now, when C starts to increase, the FC response is decreasing the weights for all the SNs up to around C = 5 and allowing all the SNs to transmit to the FC (see Fig. 3 (middle plot) ). However, for around C > 5, the FC response is by first increasing the weights for the SNs having low SNRs and as C gets larger, the FC combining strategy tends towards equal combining. Similar to Fig. 4 , in Fig. 5 (for C = 0.1) and in Fig. 6 (for C = 0.6) we plot the FC combining response (with weights in (20)) but now versus the fraction of compromised SNs (β). Interestingly, the optimal FC weight response for the less i n f ormati ve SNs (i.e., SN1, SN2, SN4, SN5, SN6, SN7, and SN11 classified by the power allocation scheme in the case of attack−free (i.e., C = 0)) remains almost constant with respect to β both in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 . However, that is not the case for the more in f ormative SNs (i.e., SN3, SN8, SN9, SN10, and SN12). In Fig. 5 , we observe that for the SNs 3, 8, and 12 (corresponding to the best SNRs) this relationship is convex while for the SNs 9 and 10 it is monotonically decreasing. Interestingly, in Fig. 6 (for a larger C) this relationship becomes monotonically decreasing for all the more i n f ormati ve SNs mentioned above.
The results provided in this Section cannot be attained in practice as the exact knowledge of C is required. However, they provide an insight as to how the FC power allocation and the weight combining strategy is influenced by both the attacker strength (C) and the compromised SNs fraction (β).
B. Detection Performance for the Proposed Strategies 1) Detection Performance for Fixed β:
Now, we investigate the detection performance of the proposed strategies described in Section IV-B for a fixed β.
In Fig. 7 , we show the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) parametrized on the attacker strength (C) for the proposed W AFB B and O AFB B strategies compared to the attack f r ee ( AF) case [9] (i.e., when there is no attack). We can observe that for C = 0.3 (as expected), the W AFB B strategy performs similar to the optimum strategy in (20) and better than O AFB B (up to C = 0.6) whereas after that, the O AFB B strategy dramatically outperforms the latter. We also note that for relatively very large C, it is possible to totally bli nd the FC when the W AFB B is used (i.e., to make it incapable of detecting) but only when the WSN operates at low probability of false alarm (P f a ). Now, we would like to emphasize that the W AFB B strategy has particular importance when the FC does not have any a-priori knowledge about the β and C parameters. But the O AFB B strategy requires just knowledge of the compromised SNs fraction 4 (β) which is possible to be obtained by the FC in practice.
2) Detection Performance for Fixed C: Now, we investigate the detection performance of the proposed strategies described in Section IV-B for a fixed C.
In Fig. 8 , we show the ROC performance for the two different proposed strategies (parametrized on β) compared to the optimum strategy in (20) and AF in [9] . We can observe that for small β (more specifically β = 0.1), both the optimum and O AFB B strategies outperform the W AFB B strategy and their performances are worst than the AF performance. Interesting, when β increases (more specifically, β = 0.5 and β = 1), both the optimum and O AFB B strategies outperform the AF detection performance for all the values of P f a and their detection performances improve proportionally with β. This is as expected, since from the attacker's perspective there does exists an optimum β that most degrades the FC's detection capability (Fig. 10 later on captures and demonstrates this behavior better) (see also (23) ). We would also like to make it clear that the FC's ROC performance behavior depends not only on the compromised SNs fraction (β) but also on the attacker strength (C i ). Furthermore, the optimum β that causes the maximum FC's detection degradation depends itself in C i (see (23) ). Deviating from this optimum strategy (i.e., (β, C i )), the attacker might help the FC to further utilize its detection performance rather than causing degradation. While from β = 0.5 to β = 1 the performance of the optimum strategy in (20) and the O AFB B strategy improves, that is not the case when W AFB B is used (its performance degrades) and when β = 1 it is sufficient to bli nd the FC even when the WSN operates at a relatively high P f a . Now, this is as expected because the W AFB B requires no a-pri ori knowledge regarding the attacker's parameters.
In Fig. 9 , we investigate the same situation as for Fig. 8 but now for C = 0.6. In this case (when β = 0.1), the optimum strategy slightly outperforms the O AFB B and W AFB B strategies. However, similar to Fig. 8 , when more than 50% of SNs are compromised, the O AFB B strategy significantly outperforms the W AFB B strategy. Furthermore, its detection performance improves (for β ≥ 0.5) proportionally as β increases.
In Fig. 10 , we again show the ROC as a function of β but now for a lower C (more specifically for C = 0.2). As expected, the W AFB B performs similar to the optimum strategy and outperforms the O AFB B at low β and C, as the W AFB B is derived under these assumptions. Also, we can observe that the ROC performance of the optimum and O AFB B strategies (when β = 0.1 is used) outperforms those when β = 0.5. This is an intuitive result as the smaller the fraction of compromised SNs participating in the network, the better is the FC's detection performance. However, for β ≥ 0.5, the detection performance is shown to be improving with β whereas for the W AFB B strategy its performance degrades as β increases. Interestingly, when 50% of the SNs are compromised, both the optimum and O AFB B strategies perform in a similar manner.
It is now clear that (from the attacker perspective) there is an optimum number of compromised SNs (fraction β) that causes the maximum FC's detection performance degradation when using the O AFB B and the optimum FC strategy in (20) . On the contrary, when the W AFB B strategy is considered, we conclude that the FC's detection performance degrades as β increases. However, it has particular importance in practice as no a-priori knowledge for the attacker parameters is required.
C. Equilibrium Analysis of Minimax Game
In this section we analyze the equilibrium point of the minimax game and find the Nash Equilibrium (NE). The NE is the maximum probability of detection considering the FC's best linear weight combining strategy (joint optimization of α, p) against attacker's strategy (i.e., C for a given fraction of compromised SNs β).
In Fig. 11 the ROC behavior against the attacker's strength and the FC's combining weights is shown. As expected (see Section V on equilibrium analysis) there does exist a NE and it is shown to occur for the pair C = 0.4 and α o (with α o i in (20) ). Clearly, from the attacker's perspective, this strategy causes the maximum detection performance degradation ∀P f a and deviating from this strategy will not benefit the attacker. Now, in Fig. 12 , the modified deflection coefficient (MDC) against the attacker strength (C) is shown for two examples (i.e., with the optimum FC weights combining in (20) and the non-optimum weight combining drawn from the uniform distribution (i.e., α i ∼ U(0, 1) in (11)). We can observe that the NE is shown to occur at C = 1 and deviating from this point (i.e., this strategy) the attacker will not benefit (i.e., it will not gain in terms of the FC's performance degradation). It is also clear that if the FC deviates from the optimum combining strategy (i.e., from the weights α o i in (20)), its detection performance will be worst or at least will not improve ∀C.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of distributed detection by an under−attack WSN that operates over limited bandwidth communication fading channels. Based on a simple linear weight combining rule at the FC and adopting the modified deflection coefficient (as an alternative function to be optimized), we give closed-form expressions for the optimal FC combining weights, the SN to FC transmit power allocation, and the test statistics quantization bits. The attacker optimal strategy is also derived and shown to be dependent on the FC combining weights. Furthermore, sub-optimum FC strategies (based on weight combining and the SN transmit power) that do not require the exact knowledge of the attacker strength C are also derived and analyzed.
We have also analyzed the equilibrium to the minimax problem and have proved that the Nash Equilibrium (NE) exists and found this optimal solution numerically in the simulation results. We compare our proposed FC strategies with the one derived under an attack−free scenario and show significant detection performance improvement.
Future work will consider a general (non-linear) optimal combining strategy at the FC and study attackers that (unlike in this paper) do not know the true state of the target (i.e., they are less dangerous attackers).
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